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ABSTRACT 
 
Brett Hurst: Regional Differences in Global Systems: A Social Systems Analysis of 
European and Russian Foreign Policies in Ukraine 
(Under the direction of Holger Moroff) 
 
 From late 2013 until the present, a series of crises and conflicts have wracked 
Ukraine and contributed toward regional insecurity. Scholarship on European and Russian 
foreign policy toward Ukraine has focused on understanding the theories underlying the 
policy decisions. This paper seeks instead to apply social systems theory to understand how 
regional differences contribute to differences in what Moravcsik calls state preferences, as 
expressed in states’ foreign policies; this is done by investigating the foreign policies of the 
EU, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Russia toward Ukraine. European foreign policies tend to 
arise from economic concerns, and decision-making is often hobbled by member state 
bickering; Russian foreign policy, meanwhile, aims to maintain the privileged societal 
position of Russian elites at the top of the Russian political hierarchy. By understanding the 
regional variations from which foreign policy differences arise, it may be easier to find a 
resolution to the conflict.
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To Chelsea Hurst, whose unflagging support and optimism are what made this paper 
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CHAPTER 1: UKRAINE 
Introduction 
In 2013, Ukraine found itself split between the European Union and Russia. The 
Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, was weighing the merits of competing EU and 
Russian trade agreements when the Ukrainian government decided at the last minute to reject 
the much more popular European proposal in favor of the Russian (Saryusz-Wolski, 2014, 
p.3). Pro-Western anger rose and protesters took to the streets of Kyiv in a movement known 
as Euromaidan (MacDuffee Metzger et al., 2016, p.20). The protests escalated into riots after 
a violent government crackdown, and a months-long standoff in central Kyiv ultimately 
resulted in the removal of Yanukovych and the election of pro-Western Petro Poroshenko. 
This election did not settle the dispute between Europe and Russia, however. Shortly 
thereafter, Russia annexed the pro-Russian Crimean peninsula, and pro-Russian separatists--
aided by Russian money and materiél--instigated the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine 
(Saryusz-Wolski, 2014, pp.14-16). Meanwhile, Ukraine under Poroshenko revisited the 
European agreement and signed it, signaling a distinct convergence between Ukraine and the 
European Union. This was accompanied by bilateral and multilateral negotiations with the 
EU and European states in order to hammer out financial assistance and peace talks. 
Ukraine lies in what the EU calls "the common neighborhood," meaning that it lies in 
a geographical gray area between European and Russian influence. The resulting 
(dis)harmony of European and Russian foreign policies toward the "common neighborhood" 
have had profound effects on the Ukrainian state. In order to understand the rationale behind 
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both European and Russian foreign policy, one must understand the theories behind the 
policymaking. 
This paper considers two propositions: first, that social systems theory offers unique 
perspectives for understanding the foreign policy decisions of state and transnational actors, 
as illustrated by the foreign policymaking of European actors and Russia toward Ukraine; 
and second, that thus far academic insights into the foreign policymaking regarding Ukraine 
by these actors has focused on analyzing European policy in light of Cooper’s postmodern 
world theory, and Russian policy in light of realist thinking (and in particular, offensive 
realism). Thus this paper offers a synthesis of these two propositions: that social systems 
theory not only offers a salient perspective on the formation of foreign policy (with a 
particular focus on European and Russian policies toward Ukraine), but that it also 
contributes to and critiques the current academic dialogue on the subject. 
Section 1.1: Methodology 
 This paper focuses on an analysis of the theoretical forces that shape foreign policy 
decisions, and thus each section begins with a description of the prevailing theoretical 
explanation behind an actor’s (or set of actors’) Ukraine policies. Each section ends with a 
social systems theory analysis. These analyses are accomplished using the following 
methodological recommendation by Luhmann (1997, p.73) as a guide: 
“A sociological theory that wants to explain [regional] differences, should not 
introduce them as givens, that is, as independent variables; it should rather start with 
the assumption of a world society and then investigate, how and why this society 
tends to maintain or even increase regional inequalities. It is not very helpful to say 
that the Serbs are Serbs and, therefore, they make war. The relevant question is rather, 
whether or not the form of the political state forced upon all regions on earth fits to all 
local and ethnic conditions, or, whether or not the general condition, not of 
exploitation or suppression but of global neglect stimulates the search for personal 
and social, ethnic or religious identities.” 
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Section 1.2: The Actors 
 The crises in Ukraine—whether in the economy, the government, or the war-torn 
East—affect far more than the state in which they are located. Ripples started in Ukraine 
have spread across Europe and Russia and beyond, in large part because of Ukraine’s many 
important connections to its surrounding regions. 
 In this paper, I focus on five foreign policy actors: the European Union, three EU 
member states, and Russia. Although the EU’s foreign policy is limited in scope (the 
deficiencies made up for by the policies of its individual member states), it has played (and 
continues to play) a critical role in the development of Ukraine’s political and economic 
situation. Beyond that, it is also a powerful rallying force among pro-Western Ukrainians, 
and it was a desire to draw closer to institutions like the EU that sparked the Euromaidan 
movement and its subsequent developments (MacDuffee Metzger et al., 2016, p.17). 
 Again, important aspects of European foreign policy are left to EU member states 
rather than the transnational institutions; therefore, within the EU, I also focus on the foreign 
policies of Germany, Italy, and Poland. I chose these three states in particular primarily due 
to their economic ties to Ukraine: Italy is the fifth largest export destination for Ukrainian 
goods, and Germany and Poland are, respectively, the second and fifth largest import origins 
for goods entering the Ukrainian market. These rankings represent billions of dollars worth 
of trade between these states (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2017). 
Although my criteria for selecting these three states was based on their economic ties, 
each carries additional significance beyond their trade linkages with Ukraine. Germany is the 
EU’s leading economic and political powerhouse. It was a founding member of the European 
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Coal and Steel Community and has been involved in the European project since its inception. 
Among our three examples, it may be seen as representing northern Europe. 
Italy is often considered a rising power within the European Union. While it has yet 
to be as central an actor as Germany or France, Italy has a relatively large economy and has 
shown a willingness and occasional desire to improve its standing within the EU’s power 
hierarchy. Italy joined the European Community during its second expansion alongside states 
like Spain and Portugal, and may be seen as representing the southern or Mediterranean 
region. 
Poland has also been considered a rising power among the EU’s newest cohort of 
members. In spite of its temperamental domestic politics, it plays an important leading role 
among other eastern EU member states, and is a member of the influential Visegrád Group 
alongside the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. Poland is the newest member state of 
our three European examples, having joined in the most recent wave of acceding states 
(dubbed the Eastern Expansion). It may be seen as representative of the Central and Eastern 
European member states. Importantly, Poland also has strong cultural and historical linkages 
to Ukraine, leading to far more direct interaction between the two states than with either Italy 
or Germany. 
Because the three European states chosen as case studies were selected due to their 
close economic ties with Ukraine, any analysis of their policymaking risks being inapplicable 
to other European actors whose economies are less dependent on Ukrainian trade. However, 
given that each of the case studies is also a prominent decision-making actor within the EU 
as well as a leader among member states in their respective geographic regions, I believe they 
are still valuable objects of analysis, as their foreign policy decisions influence those of their 
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neighbors and the EU community as a whole. Analyzing policymaking toward Ukraine 
among member states without such close economic ties would also be an interesting avenue 
of investigation, and may prove worthwhile as a future research project. 
The fifth actor to be considered, after the EU and its three representative member 
states, is Russia. Russia and Ukraine have been intertwined for far longer than merely the 
current situation implies; their shared history extends for centuries, if not a millennium. Both 
nations trace their roots back to the Kyivan Rus civilization, which had its capitol in Kyiv but 
included important cities in what is now Western Russia. Even after the fall of the Kyivan 
Rus, the two nations have, through shared cultural heritage and geographic proximity, been 
consistently entangled with one another, from the 1654 Pereyaslav agreement allying 
Ukrainian Cossacks and Moscow against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth through 
Ukraine’s incorporation in the Soviet Union and subsequent independence (Rywkin, 2014, 
p.121). Russia’s constant influence in Ukraine, and its direct and indirect actions in the 
current Ukrainian crises, cannot be ignored.
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CHAPTER 2: SOCIAL SYSTEMS THEORY 
 Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory is as eye opening as it is intimidating—at 
least initially. Luhmann’s theory has revolutionized the way social systems are discussed, 
and can be especially enlightening in our discussion of how different actors approach foreign 
policy toward Ukraine. However, though his theory looms large in the German-speaking 
academic world, it is still relatively little-known outside of it (Becker & Seidl, 2006, p.10). 
Because of its continued novelty among English-speaking audiences (not to mention its 
theoretical complexity), my introduction of social systems will be lengthier and more in-
depth than those of Cooper’s theory of the postmodern world or the theory of offensive 
realism. 
 Luhmann separates the world into observable process phenomena known as systems. 
These systems vary greatly from one to another, but in all cases possess three basic criteria 
which, in most cases, Luhmann adapted from principles drawn from biology. First, the 
systems are autopoietic, or self-replicating; a system is not beholden to any external 
influence in order to continue functioning, but rather is able to sustain and reproduce itself 
like a single-celled organism undergoing mitosis (Moeller, 2006, p.12). Second, they are 
operatively closed, or self-contained and entirely separated from their environment, like a 
cell contained within its cellular membrane (Moeller, 2006, p.14). Third, they are 
differentiated, or definably distinct from one another, like a skin cell compared against a 
blood cell (Moeller, 2006, p.21; Mattheis, 2012, p.629). 
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 Systems are self-contained; there is an unyielding distinction between a system and 
everything that exists outside of it, referred to as its environment. The two are entirely 
separate; a system cannot communicate with its environment, and vise versa. The 
environment can, however, affect (or irritate) the system, like how an external force can 
“irritate” a single-cell organism without compromising its cellular membrane. These 
irritations can in turn prompt the system to respond (or resonate) to the irritation, either by 
working around or by working with it (Moeller, 2006, p.38; Mattheis, 2012, p.631). 
Additionally, this separation means that a system’s perception of its environment is never 
fully objective; it is always informed by the nature of the system. To put it another way, a 
system can never have an unobstructed view of its environment: it can only “see” by looking 
through its own membrane. Thus, every system defines the environment differently, and 
therefore defines reality as a whole differently (Moeller, 2006, p.16).  
 Luhmann’s taxonomy of human systems starts with three broad categories: systems 
of communication (or social systems), systems of life (or biological systems), and systems of 
consciousness (or psychological systems) (Moeller, 2006, p.9). Any individual human being 
is actually, in essence, the interaction point of three different systems: their physical body, 
their cognitive processes, and their communication (Moeller, 2006, p.10). Luhmann himself 
deals almost exclusively with this third form. 
 For Luhmann, society is based upon communication; in fact, the two are so 
inextricably linked that it is fair to say that society is communication (Mattheis, 2012, p.628). 
More specifically, society is based upon communication events—brief communicative 
interactions where two parties engage in some action that is mutually understood and used to 
achieve some aim. These communication events can be verbal, as with a conversation, but 
can also be defined more broadly to include gestures, political participation, even monetary 
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transactions, along with many other means (Moeller, 2006, pp.22-23). Because the social 
system is based on an immense aggregate of short-lived, ever-occurring communication 
events, it is by nature incredibly fluid. The social system shifts and evolves like an ocean 
roiling with the tide of communication events; its essence is one of change, not constancy. 
Communication events exist for incredibly brief moments in time; thus the social system, 
which consists entirely of communication events, must constantly reproduce itself (or 
undergo autopoiesis) in order to continue existing (Mattheis, 2012, p.628). 
  The social system is further subdivided into smaller subsystems. Luhmann lists many 
throughout his works, but never exhaustively; these include the economy, politics, the media, 
religion, law, science, the military, and so on. Although existing within the social system, 
each subsystem individually meets the three requirements that define a system: each is 
autopoietic, operatively closed, and differentiated. For any given subsystem, everything 
outside of its “membrane”—including the other social subsystems—exist as part of its 
environment. 
While the social system is defined by communication events writ large, individual 
subsystems are defined by specific types of communication events: the economic system, for 
instance, is defined by the exchange of money, while the political system is defined by 
communications of power (Moeller, 2006, p.24); to put it another way, the economic 
subsystem became the economic subsystem by acting economically, while the political 
subsystem became the political subsystem by acting politically (Moeller, 2006, p.41). Each 
subsystem also shares other important characteristics, like a function (the contingency or 
need that the system was formed to fill—for example, the political system formed as a means 
of making collectively binding decisions), a code (the binary of possible resolutions or 
judgments in each communicative event—for example, in the science system, 
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communication is coded either “true” or “false,” and if it cannot be coded as such, it cannot 
be processed by the science system), a medium (the means by which communication events 
occur—for example, the economic system uses the medium of money), and a program (a 
means of judging or engaging in coded communication events based upon the accumulation 
of previous coded communication events—for example, in the religion system, the use of 
scriptures, articles of faith, or catechisms) (Moeller, 2006, pp.25-29). 
These subsystems represent the largest and most important components of the social 
system, and I’ll discuss them in more depth momentarily; however, they do not represent the 
sum total of all communication events, nor can all forms of communication be neatly placed 
into one of these subsystems. Small talk on a bus, for instance, would rarely entail the 
communication events necessary for classification into a subsystem. Instead, small talk (and 
similar communicative exercises) is what Luhmann calls an interactive communicative 
episode. This small-scale, insubstantial communicative event doesn’t fit into a definable 
subsystem, existing instead as an ephemeral one-off interaction (Moeller, 2006, pp.29-30). A 
more substantial component of the social system, however, is the organization. 
Organizations are larger than interactive communicative episodes, but smaller than 
subsystems; yet their influence is vital to the modern social system. The central characteristic 
of an organization is membership—you’re either in or you’re out—and its central function is 
decision-making. This latter point drives an organization’s autopoiesis: every decision an 
organization makes leads to further decisions that need to be made, and thus further 
justifications for the organization’s continued existence. A single subsystem can incorporate 
countless organizations: the religious subsystem, for instance, incorporates thousands of 
church organizations with radically different sizes, beliefs, structures, and so on. Similarly, 
an organization can straddle two or more subsystems: the paramilitary organization FARC, 
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for example, certainly participates in the military subsystem, but can be just as active in the 
political subsystem. Organizations like banks, churches, schools and universities, political 
parties, corporations, and countless others are key players within and between social 
subsystems (Moeller, 2006, pp.31-32). 
However, as important as organizations are (and their role should not be understated), 
it is the social subsystems that dominate Luhmann’s theory of the social system. Just like the 
three overarching types of systems—physical, psychological and social—subsystems are 
differentiated from one another. In the modern social system, this differentiation is based 
upon the subsystems’ functions; in fact, what I have to this point referred to as social 
subsystems would more accurately be called function systems (and shall be referred to as such 
from this point forward) (Moeller, 2006, p.24). Because of the primacy of function in guiding 
the modern social system’s differentiation, the system as a whole is described as functionally 
differentiated. Functional differentiation is the key defining aspect of modern society, and is 
what sets it apart from pre-modern social systems. The type of differentiation existing within 
the social system has developed and evolved through several different iterations throughout 
history (Moeller, 2006, p.41). The form of differentiation immediately previous to functional 
differentiation is known as stratified differentiation; in this form, the major divisions of 
society are based not on function, but upon unequal social groups like the Brahmans and the 
untouchables in India (Moeller, 2006, pp.44-45). 
The key difference between functional differentiation and stratified differentiation is 
in communication potential. Whereas people in a functionally differentiated society have 
equal access to participation in all function systems, people in a stratified differentiated 
society do not—a medieval European peasant, for instance, would not have the same access 
to social systems that a nobleman would, who in turn wouldn’t have the same access as a 
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king (Luhmann, 1977, p.33). In a functionally differentiated society, however, every person 
is equally able to participate in all systems, although—crucially—to unequal degrees: a 
Silicon Valley CEO and a teenager mowing lawns as a summer job have radically different 
economic capabilities, but both are equally welcome to exchange what money they have for 
goods and services in the economic function system (Luhmann, 1977, p.36). 
While functional differentiation arose from stratified differentiation, it is important to 
note that stratified differentiation has not been entirely replaced or eliminated. Although we 
may speak of functional differentiation as replacing stratification, or of stratification as 
preceding functional differentiation, it is entirely possible for the two to coexist with one as a 
primary form of differentiation and the other as a secondary form. This results in some 
regions (notably post-Soviet states) experiencing far more stratification than others (notably 
EU member states). 
Functional differentiation possesses several advantages over other forms of 
differentiation, of which I will discuss three major examples. First, it is superior in its ability 
to resolve open contingencies. In functional differentiation, a function system forms as a 
direct response to some unfulfilled societal need. For example, when the need arose to set 
societal norm expectations (especially regarding deviant behavior), the law system was 
created (Luhmann, 1977, p.31). 
Second, it enables the social system to increase in complexity. A more complex social 
system is more robust and allows for greater problem solving; or, to use Luhmann’s terms, a 
greater ability to resolve open contingencies. As individual function systems themselves 
become more complex, the overall social system becomes more complex as well. An 
important means by which function systems increase in complexity is through the expansion 
or multiplication of organizations. 
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Third, functional differentiation leads to structural coupling, or close interactions 
between different function systems. While function systems are by definition wholly discrete 
from one another (remember, for any given function system, all other function systems exist 
only in the surrounding environment), they are still able to irritate each other (Moeller, 2006, 
p.36). Function systems respond to the irritation by adjusting or evolving in order to resonate 
with it. As function systems increase in complexity, two or more function systems may begin 
to irritate one another more frequently. If this irritation and resonance continues to increase 
in frequency, the function systems can become structurally coupled, where any development 
in one prompts a corresponding resonance in the other, and vise versa. This process greatly 
increases the complexity of participating function systems and makes them more socially 
relevant (Moeller, 2006, p.37). The political function system acts as a perfect example of 
structural coupling: although it is definably distinct from all other function systems, 
communication that occurs in the political system can directly impact economic practices, 
religious freedoms, or military action, and decisions from the legal system often constrain 
political processes (Moeller, 2006, pp.38-39). 
Although social function systems are global systems, social systems theory does not 
aspire toward a utopian global citizenry; social systems theory is concerned with 
communication events, not human individuals, so while communication may be global in 
nature, individuals are still bound by their respective governments (Moeller, 2006, p.54). Nor 
has the global social system yet succeeded in subverting the political function system’s 
reliance on divisions between states; instead, borders and regions continue to play a 
significant role in both dividing and defining the world. Luhmann stresses, though, that this 
is to be expected. Each system defines its own reality, informed by its own goals and 
tempered by its interactions with its environment. The political function system is dominated 
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by a definition of reality where state organizations are not only important—they are 
necessary conditions to the way politics “works.” Differences in the degree to which different 
states value sovereignty or borders reflect the differences in their definitions of reality. Yet in 
spite of all this, all states still exist in the same global political function system (Moeller, 
2006, p.56).  
When taken together, Luhmann’s social systems theory and Wendt’s constructivist 
definitions of anarchy pair well in describing interstate relations. Wendt (1992, p.405) 
describes a communicative process of “signaling, interpreting, and responding” that 
establishes an intersubjective dialogue and sets the tenor of the interactor relationship (in the 
case of international relations, the manner or form of anarchy by which two or more states 
interact). If one state’s signals are interpreted by the other as hostile or aggressive, the second 
state will similarly respond with aggression or hostility; conversely, if the first state’s signals 
are interpreted as cooperative, the second state will be more inclined to offer reciprocal 
cooperative responses. Luhmann’s description of systems creating their own definitions of, 
explanations for, and rationalizations about their environments indicates that different social 
systems—based on as disparate of conditions as different cultures, histories, economic 
makeup, and so on—will interpret different environmental stimuli in different ways; thus, 
while the governing institutions and organizations in one state may interpret another state’s 
signal as hostile, that same signal may be interpreted as cooperative (or at least competitive) 
by government actors in a third state. Hence, it is to be expected that different states will 
express different foreign policy responses to the same phenomenon.  
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CHAPTER 3: EUROPE 
Section 3.1: Europe and Ukraine 
 The European Union has been a player in Ukrainian affairs from the beginning: the 
EU’s diplomatic involvement with Ukraine began in the early 1990s, almost immediately 
following both Ukraine’s independence and the official formation of the European Union 
under the Maastricht Treaty (European Court of Auditors, 2016, p.10). Although initially the 
relationship was tempered by the EU’s reluctance to involve itself too closely with post 
Soviet states, the geographic situation following the Union’s 2004 “Eastward Expansion” 
placed Ukraine on the EU’s eastern frontier, and granted Ukraine a new importance in EU 
policymaking (Kuzio, 2017, p.105). 
Ukraine’s importance to the EU spreads across multiple dimensions, beyond a shared 
border. Ukraine is a large market for European goods; it’s the 27th largest trade partner for 
the Union overall, 27th largest exporter to the EU, and the 24th largest importer of goods from 
the EU, all of which place Ukraine higher on the list of EU trade partners than all states 
currently applying for EU membership, with the exception of Turkey (European 
Commission, 2016, p.1). Its geographical proximity to the EU makes its domestic stability a 
particularly important security concern for the Union. This fact drove the EU’s decision to 
create the Eastern Partnership, a special dimension of the European Neighborhood Policy 
that focused primarily on Ukraine and other Eastern European border states (European Court 
of Auditors, 2016, p.7). 
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By the unique nature of the European Union, individual EU member states are just as 
active, if not more so, in foreign policymaking as the overall EU institutions. This makes 
understanding Ukraine’s bilateral dealings with individual European states as important as 
awareness of its multilateral dealings with the European Union. Germany, for example, is an 
important trade and investment partner with Ukraine, although that relationship is imperiled 
by Ukraine’s many crises. Germany is the second largest importer to Ukraine; in 2016, 
Germany exported $5.52 billion worth of goods (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 
2017). Beyond trade, German investment is very important for the Ukrainian economy, 
totaling $5.5 billion in 2015. By the end of that same year, Germany was the third highest 
investor in Ukraine behind Cyprus (home to Ukrainian and Russian oligarchs’ shell 
corporations) and the Netherlands. German firms are particularly involved in metal 
production, wholesale and retail trade, and rubber; however, their continued investment is 
jeopardized by economic and political instability, as well as rampant corruption. For many 
German investors, doing business in Ukraine has proven too costly to continue, and German 
direct investment dropped 91% in 2014 (Getmanchuk & Solodkyy, 2016, pp.18-20). 
While Italian relations with Ukraine may not carry the same weight as German 
relations in terms of their ability to influence the EU as a whole, they are nonetheless another 
important example of bilateral foreign policy. This is particularly so given Italy’s economic 
ties to Ukraine: Italy is the fifth largest export destination for Ukraine, importing $2.66 
billion worth of goods in 2016 (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2017), and the 
third largest trading partner within the EU (Zarembo, 2016a, p.20). Italy is generally 
interested in Ukrainian agricultural products, and Italian businesses located in Ukraine focus 
on real estate, food, and energy, including renewable energy sources (Zarembo, 2016a, 
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pp.22-23). Both states eagerly hope for a free trade agreement between Ukraine and the EU 
(Zarembo, 2016a, p.20). 
 Poland, meanwhile, has much stronger historical and geographic linkages with 
Ukraine than either of the previous states. Poland once controlled much of Ukraine’s modern 
territory, and Polish cultural influence is still strongly felt in Western Ukraine (Zarembo, 
2016b, p.5). Unlike Germany and Italy, Poland shares a border with Ukraine, which brings a 
sense of immediacy to their bilateral dealings that is not seen in either of our previous 
examples (Zarembo, 2016b, p.24). Poland exports $3.53 billion worth of materials to 
Ukraine, and is the fifth largest import origin for the Ukrainian market (The Observatory of 
Economic Complexity, 2017). After a lull in Polish investments in Ukraine from 2014 to 
2015, trade relations have improved dramatically—Zarembo (2016b, p.21) notes that Polish 
investment in the first half of 2016 totalled $791 million, already more than the total 
investments in 2015. Ukraine benefits most from Polish investment in the following 
economic areas: financial services and insurance; manufacturing; motor vehicle and 
motorcycle repair; agriculture, forestry, and fisheries; and administrative services (Zarembo, 
2016b, p.23). Additionally, Ukrainian workers are much sought out in Poland to replace the 
large numbers of Polish workers migrating westward (Zarembo, 2016b, p.24). 
 The foreign policy decisions of each of these actors—the EU, Germany, Italy, and 
Poland—are typically analyzed in light of their membership in what Cooper calls the 
Postmodern World, a theoretical appellation marking a distinct shift in how certain states 
view sovereignty, trade, domestic and foreign affairs, and so on. Cooper’s theory is a useful 
framework for describing European involvement with Ukraine, but further analysis from a 
social systems standpoint can provide deeper insights into the context, motivations, and 
decisions influencing European foreign policy toward Ukraine. 
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Section 3.2: Cooper’s Postmodern Worldview 
  Cooper’s theory divides contemporary and historical societies into three groups: 
premodern, modern, and postmodern. The three groups generally represent a spectrum of 
development along which different societies (in particular, European societies) have either 
developed or regressed (Cooper, 2000, p.15).  
Early societies stretching from Mesopotamia until the end of the Thirty Years’ War 
and the Treaty of Westphalia existed in regional systems (not to be confused with Luhmann’s 
use of the term) that tended towards empire. In this period, rival civilizations sought to 
subdue their neighbors and bring “order” to “chaos” through the establishment of empire. 
With conquest came stability—previously belligerent competitors became instead (mostly) 
peaceful servants of the same ruling authority, allowing for freedom of movement and trade, 
exchange of ideas, and—importantly—respite from war. However, it takes strong hands to 
hold an empire together. The component ethnic nations are bound not by common purpose or 
identity, but by common subjugation, and the ethnic cleavages within an empire must be held 
fast to prevent their disintegration. Should the empire fall, the region would again enter a 
state of dangerous chaos, awaiting the next conqueror (Cooper, 2000, pp.10-11). This tight 
grip discouraged innovation or cultural development, seeing them as potentially subversive; 
as Cooper (2002) states, “Historically, empires have generally been static.” 
 The binding power of the Catholic church and, later, the Treaty of Westphalia 
enabled the small European states to introduce a third option to the existing dichotomy of 
empire and chaos: the balance of power (Cooper, 2000, p.8). The small states of Europe 
feared both the destructive violence of chaos and the powerless domination of hegemony. 
Once any one state grew into too much of a threat, its neighbors would begin to balance 
against their power. This could take the form of either internal balancing, where a single state 
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increases its own power capabilities in response to a rising threat, or external balancing, 
where multiple states pool their resources in a coalition whose joint capabilities match or 
outdo those of the rising power (Cooper, 2002; Walt, 2002, p.212). Although this system did 
not prevent war—if anything, it promoted increased smaller-scale conflicts—it succeeded for 
a time in preventing domination by any one hegemon and promoting the liberty of the 
individual states; as Cooper (2002) described, “domestic order was purchased at the price of 
international anarchy.” Balance of power existed on the knife’s edge between chaos on side 
and imperial hegemony on the other, but so long as that balance was maintained, the states 
involved could experience remarkable benefits. Unlike the rigid authoritarianism of empire, 
where new ideas were threats to the status quo, the more relaxed rule allowed by balance of 
power encouraged innovation, leading to many of the great social, political, scientific, and 
artistic developments across Europe (Cooper, 2000, pp.10-11). 
 The end of balance-of-power as the European system’s status quo came about slowly. 
Cooper (2000, p.11) finds the beginning of the end in the 1871 Prussian-led unification of 
Germany. The emergent German state became a powerhouse, a threat too large for the other 
European states to balance against as they had previously. When the German threat would 
grow too great, the other European nations were forced to rely on support from states beyond 
the traditional bounds of Europe—namely, Russia and the United States. 
 At roughly the same time, the development of new technologies and the spread of the 
industrial revolution to the military increased the lethality of warfare dramatically. Like a 
parade of increasing lethality, machine guns, poison gas, aerial bombings, and, eventually, 
nuclear weapons drove the stakes of conflict ever higher. In short, the costs of war 
increasingly outweighed the benefits—a troubling proposition, given the high likelihood of 
combat under balance of power (Cooper, 2000, p.11). 
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 While Europe’s weapons grew more destructive and less controllable, its populations 
grew exponentially. More and more, the brunt of violence was shifted from military forces to 
civilians. The devastation of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars exposed greater 
numbers of nonmilitary Europeans to the horrors that attend warfare. This trend continued 
until its climax in the First and Second World Wars, where it was in many places 
accompanied by a rise in democratic power—thus giving a greater political voice to the 
victims of war (Cooper, 2000, p.11).  
 The Cold War became the last great theater for European balance of power. Rather 
than a balance between numerous small powers, it resolved down to a balance between two 
forces: the liberal democratic West, and the communist autocratic East. The Cold War 
signaled an end to Eurocentric balance of power, as the centers of power had effectively 
shifted outside of the traditional sets of European states entirely; instead, the United States 
and Russia (under the Soviet Union) had graduated from periphery allies to bipoles (Cooper, 
2000, p.13). 
 The end of the Cold War left different regions of the world in various stages of 
development. In some states, the central government has become weak or ineffectual to the 
extent that it is no longer able to constrain violence. In these states, chaos reigns, with 
criminal organizations, rebel groups, or terrorists filling the vacuum left by the government’s 
ineffectuality. Cooper (2000, p.15-16) labels this the pre-modern world, and defines it as a 
place “where the state has failed and a Hobbesian war of all against all is underway” 
(Cooper, 2002). 
 The majority of states exist in the modern world. This world is based upon balance-
of-power; security is procured by military power and ensured by balancing against rising 
threats. Security is defined as managing the status quo; rising powers are viewed with 
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suspicion as possible revisionist states. As Cooper (2000, p.18) states, “In the pre-modern 
world, states (or rather would be states) may be dangerous because they are failures; in the 
modern world, it is the successful states which are potentially dangerous.” This world is 
characterized by nationalist tribalism—states regard each other with suspicion, as they exist 
in an anarchical international system. One of the ways this is expressed, and which Cooper 
(2000, p.16-19) stresses as especially important, is by a strict distinction between internal 
affairs and external relations. Foreign relations are based upon protecting internal interests, 
and foreign intervention in internal affairs is seen as a breach of sovereignty. 
 A few states, mostly located in Europe, found themselves in an entirely new situation 
at the end of the Cold War. Traditional modern balance-of-power no longer seemed to apply 
to them. This is the creation of the postmodern world.  
Section 3.3: Postmodern Europe 
 The postmodern world differs radically from the modern one in several key ways. 
First, postmodern security doesn’t come from an inherent mistrust, but from a systemic 
interdependence (Cooper, 2002). While Europe has been cautious about bringing Ukraine 
into too much of a position of interdependence, this can be seen in a nascent sense in the 
EU’s continuing efforts to draw Ukraine closer into its open market. At first, early EU-
Ukraine treaties like the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and the EU-Ukraine Action 
Plan kept Ukraine close to Europe (European Court of Auditors, 2016, p.10), but at arm’s 
distance (Averre & Wolczuk, 2016, p.552; European Court of Auditors, 2016, p.7). That 
began to change during Viktor Yanukovych’s term as Ukrainian president, when the EU 
External Action Service worked with the Ukrainian government to sign a new Association 
Agreement expanding their cooperation (European Court of Auditors, 2016, p.10). The 
agreement sought to upgrade Ukraine’s status from “neighbor” to “associate,” a change 
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equaling more than mere semantics: the Association Agreement brought with it benefits in 
trade, visa-free travel regimes, and financial aid, as well as the remarkable objective of 
integrating Ukraine over time into the EU internal market (Petrov, Van der Loo, & Van 
Elsuwege, 2014, p.1). Following the Euromaidan protests, Yanukovych’s ouster, and 
Poroshenko’s election, both parties signed the Association Agreement.  
 Poland has made moves toward military and, on a more limited scale, economic 
interdependence with Ukraine. In early 2016, Poland, Ukraine, and Lithuania unveiled a 
combined military force, the Joint Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade (or 
LITPOLUKRbrig) (Zarembo, 2016b, p.18). Additionally, Polish and Ukrainian agreements 
allow their nations’ gas operators to cooperate along the Polish-Ukrainian border, opening 
the door for further expansion of pipelines and storage facilities (Zarembo, 2016b, p.20). 
Poland and Ukraine have expressed a mutual interest in pursuing joint production of military 
materiel, including helicopters and unmanned drones (Zarembo, 2016b, p.17).  
A second difference between postmodern and modern states regards sovereignty. For 
postmodern states, state sovereignty is no longer jealously guarded; instead, the postmodern 
world “is a highly developed system for mutual interference in each other’s domestic affairs” 
(Cooper, 2000, p.20), monitored via mutual surveillance and enforced by obedience to 
codified rules and regulations set by the postmodern community (Cooper, 2002). This was 
particularly visible during the initial, pre-Euromaidan discussions about the Association 
Agreement, as many of the factors influencing Yanukovych’s decision to walk away from the 
negotiations had to do with the domestic reform requirements stipulated by the EU as 
prerequisites to qualify for European aid money, including financial reform and freeing 
fellow politician and then-prisoner Yulia Timoshenko (Rywkin, 2014, p.122). When the 
Poroshenko government finally signed the Association Agreement, it did so with full 
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awareness of EU interference in Ukrainian affairs: in exchange for a six-year financial 
assistance package totaling 11.2 billion euros and advancing discussions on visa regime 
liberalization and further financial aid packages, Ukraine is expected to improve its finances, 
battle corruption in the government and in important business sectors (especially the gas 
industry), and provide greater legal protection for civil and human rights (Euractiv.com, 
2017; European Court of Auditors, 2016, p.7). 
That same interference is seen in bilateral deals between European states and 
Ukraine. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has played a direct role in Ukrainian domestic 
governance, helping to mediated between the Ukrainian prime minister and president in the 
hopes of preventing governmental power struggles like those that have previously occurred 
in Kyiv (Getmanchuk & Solodkyy, 2016, p.13). Meanwhile, Italy, as a decentralized state 
with strong regional powers, is a vocal proponent of Ukrainian decentralization, believing 
that Ukraine can learn from its own experiences with decentralization and can address many 
of the concerns behind the Eastern separatist movements by doing so (Zarembo, 2016a, 
pp.11-12). In Poland, although Ukraine is already among the top ten recipients of 
development aid money, officials concern themselves with promoting the reduction of 
Ukraine’s bureaucracy, combatting corruption, and creating a more effective and effectual 
government (Zarembo, 2016b, p.20). 
Third, postmodern states rely upon transnational institutions, a reliance that smashes 
the traditional barriers dividing states. In spite of Germany, Italy, and Poland’s individual 
bilateral dealings with Ukraine, each invests heavily in the success of EU-level negotiations. 
Germany, especially through the efforts of Angela Merkel, has used its considerable 
influence to maintain a unified support for Ukraine both domestically and in the EU at large, 
as well as through communications and coordination with the United States (Getmanchuk & 
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Solodkyy, 2016, p.13). Despite Italy’s strong diplomatic linkages with Russia dating back to 
the Cold War, it has often advocated for pro-Ukrainian policy positions within the framework 
of the EU, including voting for the ratification of the Association Agreement (albeit with 
reservations), vigorously supporting the Minsk Agreements, encouraging a Ukrainian visa-
free regime, and pursuing legal action against Russian elites targeted by sanctions (Zarembo, 
2016a, pp.8-9). Poland, meanwhile, was a strong proponent of Ukraine even before the 
Orange Revolution ushered in Ukraine’s pro-European movement (Zarembo, 2016b, p.4). 
Poland has also floated the idea of creating a new international institution, potentially 
operating alongside the EU and NATO, called the Intermarium Union. This Union would 
involve Poland, Ukraine, and states along the Adriatic and Baltic seas (Zarembo, 2016b, 
p.18). 
Fourth, unlike modern states, postmodern states maintain security not by force, but by 
diplomacy and other alternative means. The European Union as a transnational institution is 
an excellent example of this, as it possesses no military function—it relies on NATO and the 
individual military capabilities of its member states for its hard power defense. However, the 
EU is still very involved in resolving the security crisis in Eastern Ukraine; instead of relying 
on military power, though, it has used a combination of targeted economic sanctions and 
attempts at diplomatically brokering a peace agreement with Ukraine, Russia, and the eastern 
separatist regions. The Minsk Accords (and the later Minsk II Accords) involved key 
European players and the United States orchestrating ceasefire and peace talks between the 
active parties in the conflict—as yet to little success (Bendavid & Fairless, 2015). 
Germany’s role in the Minsk Accords has been especially active, considering the 
traditional German opinion of Ukraine has been that of just another post-Soviet state 
descending ever closer to dictatorship. This dim view changed after Euromaidan, however, 
	   24	  
and Germany is beginning to take Ukraine’s European aspirations more seriously 
(Getmanchuk & Solodkyy, 2016, p.6). Germany has since taken a lead role in driving 
Ukraine-related efforts like the Minsk Accords and the Association Agreement, in spite of 
the fact that Germany is not obligated by treaty to do so—unlike the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and France, Germany is not a signatory to the Budapest Memorandum 
(Getmanchuk & Solodkyy, 2016, pp.9-10). 
Italy has taken a prominent role in promoting and enforcing sanctions on Russia and 
in supporting the Minsk talks. In both cases, Italy’s primary motivation is the avoidance of 
military intervention (Zarembo, 2016a, pp.11-14).  
Sixth, according to Cooper (2002), the ultimate and most successful form the 
postmodern world can take is that of “liberal imperialism.” Cooper (2002) points to the EU’s 
expansions—particularly its Eastern expansion—as a template for what he describes as an 
“imperialism of neighbors,” or a “cooperative empire.” Recognizing the distasteful 
connotations the word “imperialism” dredges up—particularly, and ironically, among 
postmodern states—he nevertheless asserts that creating a willing, liberal, democratic 
commonwealth “empire.” 
Now, in spite of the promises issued by the Ukrainian government that Ukraine would 
apply for EU accession by 2020 (Reuters, 2014) and the eager lobbying by Poland for 
Ukraine to join both the EU and NATO (Zarembo, 2016b, p.6), there are no current plans in 
the works for a second “eastward expansion” to incorporate Ukraine into the European 
Union; if ever there were, surely the British referendum in 2016 shifted attention 
dramatically elsewhere (Kuzio, 2017, p.104-106). However, closer ties with both the EU and 
NATO are powerful incentives, and have in large part driven the rhetoric used in both the 
Euromaidan movement and in subsequent Ukrainian government action (MacDuffee Metzger 
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et al., 2016). Cooper (2004, p.27) even views the EU’s Neighborhood Policy, and we can 
assume the subsequent Association Agreement, as a nascent form of incorporating Ukraine 
and its regional neighbors into the Union (Cooper, 2004, p.27). 
Section 3.4: European Social Systems 
 The foreign policy actions of the European Union—and by extension, its member 
states—are heavily driven by economics. This makes sense—European economic institutions 
(which, in Luhmann’s terms, would be referred to as organizations, the social systems 
categorization they fit best into) are very complex. After all, the EU started as an economic 
institution in the European Coal and Steel Community that only branched into politics after 
time had passed. The transnational institutions, including those that constitute the EU (each a 
decision-making organization), straddle the economic and political function systems, but the 
comparative overdevelopment of the economy lends itself toward economic responses (for 
example, conditional loan disbursements, or sanctions). 
 The decreasing importance of state boundaries within the EU is perfectly in line with 
social systems theory, which states that borders are important only so far as they are imbued 
with meaning by the political system (Luhmann, 1997, p.72). When transnational institutions 
began connecting state-level governmental organizations, it began a process whereby the 
European political system reconfigured its conceptions of reality. Borders maintained their 
importance, but the level of importance attributed to them, particularly within the Schengen 
area, has demonstrably lessened. While a visa-free regime is a far cry from the type of open 
border policy espoused by the Schengen states, it is still indicative of the European political 
system’s changing definitions of what elements are important in the makeup of a state. This 
is true also between countries—Poland, for instance, is working with Ukraine to improve 
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their border crossings as a means of better facilitating Ukrainian workers migrating to fill 
Polish jobs (Zarembo, 2016b, pp.24-25). 
 The interactions occurring between political organizations (political parties, 
institutions, civil society groups, and so on) are critical in determining foreign policy. 
European societies, including the European Union itself (although the nature and extent of 
this case is bitterly debated), possess representational political systems. Moravcsik (1997, 
p.518) describes state governing institutions as inherently tied to a subgroup or subset within 
the overall domestic society; in other words, if the Social Democrats gain a majority of 
parliamentary seats in a given state, the governing institutions will represent the preferences 
of Social Democrats. These governing institutions are in flux as they are captured and 
recaptured by shifting coalitions of social actors, which places pressure on the government to 
conform to the preferences of the dominant social actors and which in turn morphs state 
preferences to match. Hence, regarding European foreign policy toward Ukraine, the need to 
be mindful of pro- and anti-Ukrainian actors. Among the former are Italian media 
organizations TG3, L’Unita, and La Stampa (Zarembo, 2016a, p.34); the Christian Democrat 
and Christian Socialist parties in Germany (Getmanchuk & Solodkyy, 2016, p.35); and the 
ruling Law and Justice party in Poland. Among the latter are the Lega Nord party in Italy 
(Zarembo, 2016a, pp.30-31), the German Russlandversteher (“those who understand 
Russia”) (Getmanchuk & Solodkyy, 2016, p.35); and a growing grassroots antipathy toward 
Ukrainian immigrants in Poland (Zarembo, 2016b, p.39). 
 Unlike Cooper, who seems to esteem postmodern states as better or more progressive 
than their counterparts, Luhmann (1997, p.77) would likely be loathe to make such a 
judgment. Certainly the heightened social complexity of Europe, due in large part to the 
establishment of powerful transnational decision-making organizations, has led to greater 
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resolution of open contingencies, better problem solving capabilities, and an increase in 
structural coupling between function systems; but Luhmann is quick to remind that greater 
development within or among function systems is not the same thing as them becoming 
better. Indeed, there can be a great deal of uncertainty and risk in such a “polycentric, 
polycontextual society” (Luhmann, 1997, p.75-76). Recent events have highlighted the many 
imperfections in the European systems, from the large-scale exclusion of refugees and 
migrants from access to function systems (a topic that certainly merits its own future 
exploration) (Ostrand, 2015) to the ever-present interstate bickering arising from 
organizational competition in a liberal intergovernmentalist union (Moravcsik, 1993, p.480; 
Schimmelfennig, 2015, p.184). 
This last point is particularly clear in the truly European struggle of state versus 
transnational institution, of which the 2016 British referendum decision to leave the EU is a 
pointed example. These disagreements can slow or even entirely hobble the EU’s decision-
making process. Another illustration of this is the recurring debate over Russian sanctions. 
Continuing the sanction regime against Russia requires the collective support of EU member 
states, each a powerful decision-making organization with its own definitions of its 
environment and its own drive towards autopoiesis. Within each state are further 
organizations and movements with their own definitions of reality and autopoietic goals; and 
so on (Kuzio, 2017, p.108). This presents a complicated power structure where an 
organization spanning a subcontinent can be halted by a communication event in one small 
region, well illustrated by the initial Dutch rejection of the Association Agreement with 
Ukraine in April 2016 (Tartwijk, 2016).  
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CHAPTER 4: RUSSIA 
Section 4.1: Structural and Offensive Realism 
 Offensive realism is a subset of neorealism, and as such it borrows heavily from 
neorealism’s assumptions. Neorealism theories build upon the central conceit that the 
structure of the international system is anarchical in nature; this focus on the structure of 
anarchy has led neorealism to also be known as “structural realism.” With no global authority 
to appeal to, states are left to fend for their own interests (Elman, 1996, pp.19-20; Waltz, 
2001, p.159). This assumption profoundly impacts the way states interact with one another; 
within a single state, the behavior of individuals or organizations can be regulated using laws 
or appeals to higher authority, but in the international system, that higher authority does not 
exist. States are instead left to their own devices to ensure their continued existence and 
prosperity. 
Due to a variety of reasons—access to resources, strength of the economy, historical 
development, and so on—different states have differing levels of military capabilities. Those 
states that are capable of mounting offensive military campaigns are known as great powers. 
The power differentials inherent in such an environment, coupled with the lack of global 
regulations on state activity, generate a profound absence of trust between states. This is 
especially true when judging another state’s motives. Behavior that, to one state, may seem 
perfectly harmless or reasonable may be viewed as provocative or outright threatening by 
their neighbor. No state can afford to take another state’s actions lightly, and no amount of 
reassurances on the part of the acting state can truly placate any other (Mearsheimer, 2001, 
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pp.30-31). This uncertainty leads to the security dilemma—if any state increases its power 
relative to its neighboring states, even if just as a defensive measure, the neighbors cannot 
trust that their developing power will not be used against them, and must increase their own 
power in order to balance the rising threat (Elman, 1996, p.15; Mearsheimer, 2001, pp.35-
36). This in turn leads to balance of power theory, in which states attempt to “check” rising 
powers by maintaining a relative power parity, either through increasing their internal power 
capabilities or by combining their power with external allies (Walt, 2002, p.212). 
 In the uncertainty bred by anarchy, a state must place its own survival as its utmost 
concern. Without the luxury of truly binding international laws or oversight, states are left to 
ensure their continued existence through the accumulation and use of military and economic 
power. A state’s actions are based primarily on the desire to maximize its chances of 
survival. While some decisions great power states make may seem strange to outside 
observers, their decisions are rational, and are aimed at promoting their self interest 
(Mearsheimer, 2001, pp.30-31). 
Section 4.2: Russian Offensive Realism 
 Offensive realism expands upon neorealist theory, with an especial interest in the 
importance of power differentials. Power differentials refer to the relative power between 
multiple states; a great power will generally have a significant power advantage over its 
competitors. Generally, the more great powers exist in a region, the less stable the region 
becomes (Elman, 1996, p.15). For offensive realists, states need to prioritize increasing their 
power differential and maintaining regional dominance over their neighbors. Security is a 
scarce resource, and the only sure way for a state to guarantee its “supply” is to accrue 
increasingly beneficial power differentials. Offensive realist foreign policy focuses on 
maximizing power and claiming as much security as possible, at other states’ expense 
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(Mearsheimer, 2001, p.36). This system leads to—and in fact encourages—aggressive 
foreign policy behaviour; after all, if a state has no reason to believe other states will cede 
them power willingly, it must claim it for itself (Walt, 2002, p.207). The ultimate means of 
ensuring power in offensive realism is to obtain regional hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2001, 
p.34; Walt, 2002, p.208). 
Offensive realism provides a very accurate framework for understanding the Russian 
response to the Euromaidan movement. Russia’s zero sum view of influence in the common 
neighborhood, along with its profound security concerns over Ukraine’s potential 
membership in Western treaties, shows a deep buy in to offensive realism’s 
conceptualization of security as a scarce resource. Russia, eager to claim more security for 
itself, has embarked on a series of aggressive foreign policy measures using both economic 
and military hard power. When it perceived that the EU was emerging as a rising threat, it 
struck out at Ukraine as a means of preserving Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe. 
 Russia’s primary foreign policy goal is establishing itself as a regional power, 
especially over the former dominion of the Soviet Union (Götz, 2015, p.9). Much of the 
urgency behind this goal comes from a sense of needing to check the increasing power of the 
EU, which Russian politicians have described as an “emerging hyper-power” (Götz, 2015, 
p.4). Götz (2015, p.9) notes that Russia’s actions in Ukraine are not the frenzied conquests of 
a revisionist state, but the deliberate moves of a great power. In the “common 
neighborhood,” that often results in friction with the EU (Haukkala, 2016, p.654).  
Haukkala (2016, pp.655-656) divides Russia’s challenges to the EU’s regional 
dominance into three. First, in the 1990s, when Russia was weakened after the fall of the 
Soviet Union, it paid rhetorical praise to EU standards, ideals, and goals while in practice 
doing little if anything to attain them. Second, in the early 2000s, Russia actively began to 
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distance itself from those same goals and ideals. Instead, Russian discourse became 
embittered toward the United States and the EU, accusing them of taking advantage of 
Russia’s post-Soviet weakness to impose unwanted foreign policies while marginalizing the 
Russian state. The Russian government also blasted the EU for forcing states in the “common 
neighborhood” into a choice between Europe or Russia. Third, Russia’s most recent moves, 
first with the Eurasian Customs Union and Economic Union and then later with its activities 
in Ukraine, show a state that is confidant in its ability to tussle for regional dominance. 
Ukraine itself is very important to Russia. The border between the two states runs 
nearly 1500 miles long and is situated close to not only the Russian capital, but its economic 
and industrial centers as well (Götz, 2015, p.3). Ukraine’s population of 45 million makes it a 
large market for Russian exports—a market that would effectively close should Ukraine 
adopt European merchandise standards beyond Russia’s capabilities to reproduce. 
Furthermore, if Ukraine were to begin colluding with the European Union, Russia would see 
it as an incursion by a competitive great power into its sphere of influence. Because of this, 
as Russia became more and more emboldened, Ukraine came to be a rational area to assert 
Russia’s growing dominance. Russian policy in the “common neighborhood” quickly 
centered on distancing Ukraine from Western alliances and institutions (Götz, 2015, p.4). In 
many ways, Russian policy in Ukraine has been deliberately provocative, a means of 
thumbing their nose at the EU (Haukkala, 2016, p.653). 
During the Yanukovych years, Russia achieved many of its aspirations in Ukraine, 
although not all. Their ambitions in Ukraine were both enabled and checked by the Ukrainian 
government—though Yanukovych is often characterized as being pro-Russian, that was not 
be entirely the case. It’s true that he had closer ties to Russia than to the West, and he 
certainly didn’t meet European norms of good governance, but it would be more accurate to 
	   32	  
state his position not as pro-Russian or pro-European, but rather as pro-Yanukovych. Hence, 
while he did capitulate to Russia by forestalling Ukraine’s attempts to join NATO and by 
extending the Russian navy’s lease of Crimean ports an additional quarter of a century, he 
also hedged his bets and pursued the Association Agreement with the European Union (Götz, 
2015, p.4). This was met in Russia with much displeasure. They responded first by cutting 
off trade with Ukraine, before extending the offer of a substantial aid package should Kyiv 
back away from the Association Agreement (Götz, 2015, p.5). 
Again, Yanukovych capitulated to Russia, but this time he encountered an unexpected 
amount of resistance from Ukrainian citizens, including the overtly pro-European 
Euromaidan movement, resulting in his eventual removal from office (Götz, 2015, p.5). This 
was a dangerous development in Russia’s zero-sum game for control of its neighbors. Putin 
decried Yanukovych’s expulsion as an illegal, illegitimate coup, an example of the 
unscrupulous West interfering in the sovereignty of foreign states (Marten, 2015, p.189), but 
the damage was done, and the worst had happened—Ukraine had unabashedly chosen 
Europe instead of Russia. 
The Putin government decided to change tack. Götz (2015, p.5) divides their response 
into four strategies, beginning first with the annexation of Crimea. Second, Russia refused to 
recognize Ukraine’s interim government, referring to them instead as a “fascist junta” and 
raising gas prices dramatically. Third, Russia played into long-simmering belligerence in 
Eastern Ukraine, instigating protests and, eventually, an uprising. Fourth, the Russians sought 
to force the Ukrainian government into granting greater autonomy to the regions bordering 
Russia, allowing its northern neighbor to exert influence over them. If all went well, Russian 
troops may have been able to be stationed in the autonomous regions as peacekeepers, 
ensuring that Ukraine remained firmly under Russian dominance. 
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While not all of Russia’s strategies have turned out as planned, they have succeeded 
in creating a number of crises for Ukraine. The first critical crisis was the annexation of 
Crimea. Since Ukraine gained its independence, Russia—eager to maintain a naval presence 
in the Black Sea—has leased land in Sevastopol on the Crimean peninsula to house their 
naval bases. That lease has been a continuing friction point between the two states, but 
Russia has always been successful in applying pressure that allows them to keep their bases 
running (Marten, 2015, pp.189-190). When the Euromaidan movement succeeded in 
removing Yanukovych from office, the continuation of Russia’s lease agreement fell into 
question, and soldiers in unmarked uniforms suddenly appeared on the peninsula (Götz, 
2015, pp.5-6). These soldiers, called “polite people” in Russian, were better known by their 
Ukrainian moniker, the “little green men.” They secured the peninsula and paved the way for 
the passage of a referendum on Crimea seceding from Ukraine and joining instead with 
Russia (Marten, 2015, p.189). 
By far the most devastating crisis Russia has fomented, though, is the conflict in 
Eastern Ukraine. Protests in opposition to the post-Yanukovych government in the East, and 
especially in the Donbas region, quickly turned violent before spiraling out of control. While 
there is still not damning evidence of the Russian government’s involvement, circumstantial 
evidence abounds. Poorly equipped local militia members with irregular fatigues and 
weapons are joined not only by Russian and Crimean “protest tourists,” but by squads of 
disciplined and experienced soldiers clad in Russian armor and bearing Russian weapons 
while carrying out carefully planned and executed operations. While native Ukrainian 
separatists do seem to be leading the rebel groups, it is apparent that Russia is keeping them 
well stocked and supplied (Götz, 2015, p.6). Why might Russia be interested in creating this 
particular conflict? Both Götz (2015, p.7) and Marten (2015, p.190) point out that NATO 
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does not allow states to join if they are in the midst of ethnic warfare. Beyond this, it’s 
possible that Russia viewed such action as a low-risk, low-cost means of dealing with 
Ukraine; no massive Russian troop rollout was needed if Ukrainian separatists could be 
coopted instead, and while there may be a global outcry against the situation, it was expected 
to disappear into the fog of other world crises and be forgotten. This hope was dashed, 
however, when a separatist militia shot down a Malaysian airliner carrying dozens of 
European citizens, solidifying European opposition to Russia (Marten, 2015, p.197). 
Section 4.3: Russian Social Systems 
  Offensive realism proves very useful in describing the immediate context of Russian 
foreign policymaking vis-à-vis Ukraine, but social systems theory enables us to take a far 
more in-depth look at the social and societal background. This is possible for many reasons, 
but in particular because the neorealist tradition focuses its level of analysis on states; 
anything in the domestic domain is not considered (Elman, 1996). Social systems theory, 
however, focuses on all of society, and is thus suited to investigate the inner workings of 
Russian social and organizational systems. 
 For Luhmann (1997, p.70), the great danger in a functionally differentiated system is 
exclusion. Following the dissolution of the USSR and the disastrous economic turns of the 
1990s, Russia as a state was marginalized, its people impoverished, and the threat of state-
level exclusion from global systems began to loom unsettlingly large. Whether or not such a 
statewide exclusion was actually possible is beside the point; instead, the point is that key 
elements of the Russian social system defined their reality as such that exclusion was 
imminent. 
 As Russia stabilized throughout the 2000s, it did so thanks mostly to two factors: 
state control of natural gas deposits, and an ever-expanding executive power. Neither factor 
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is conducive to long-term stability, however, and both in turn contribute to the stratification 
of the Russian political system. As Ahrend (2005, p.585) described, the Russian economy’s 
reliance on natural gas does not in and of itself condemn the state to a “resource curse;” 
however, the solutions Ahrend enumerates—sound fiscal policy, a non-corrupt and efficient 
state apparatus, a strong civil society, and diversification of the economy—have yet to 
materialize. In their stead the resource sector is controlled by state-sanctioned oligarchs, 
often given majority shares in gas companies as recompense for service to the state 
(Gel’man, 2016, p.455). In short, Russia’s continued overreliance on its natural gas deposits 
has underdeveloped its economic organizations, financed the stratification of the political 
function system, and weakened Russia’s long-term ability to reliably participate in the global 
economy. 
 The second factor in Russia’s stabilization is the consolidation of power by the 
government’s executive branch. Constitutions play an important role in Luhmann’s 
descriptions of the state; a constitution is an example of structural coupling between the law 
function system and the political function system—a legal document with real political 
power (Mattheis, 2012). The Russian constitution, however, is weak, and fails to constrain 
the already-powerful executive branch (Sakwa, 2010). Within the political system, the 
executive branch (including the office of the president) is what Luhmann would label a 
decision-making organization, and a powerful one—it occupies the central role in Russian 
government. It possesses a dual-natured autopoiesis: its primary autopoietic process, making 
decisions that ensure its continued functioning, is paired with a secondary process of making 
decisions that preserve its status at the top of the stratified political subsystem. It does so by 
way of informal patronage networks—social subsystems wherein access is limited to a 
privileged few clients and elites (Hale, 2005, p.137). 
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 However, the tension between a hierarchical power structure within a global system 
built upon equal access to function systems can lead to widespread unrest, social movements, 
demonstrations, and even revolution. Those at the top of the power hierarchy fear social 
unrest; the fate of the Yanukovych regime following the Maidan movement illustrates why. 
This proves to be a powerful motivator for states like Russia to react strongly against such 
movements in their neighbors, both to delegitimize the specific social movements in the other 
states and to disincentivize malcontents in their own state from acting similarly (Koesel & 
Bunce, 2013). 
 The importance of the informal stratified systems (and its own subdivisions, like 
patronage networks) in the post-Soviet region should not be understated. They have a heavy 
influence on the rest of Russian society; in social systems terms, they have structurally 
coupled with the political, legal, and media function systems, as well as many more. Because 
they are differentiated by stratification instead of function, they cut across functional barriers 
and are present across the broad spectrum of Russian organizations; as Moravcsik (1997, 
518) describes, “Clientalistic authoritarian regimes may distinguish those with familial, 
bureaucratic, or economic ties to the governing elite from those without.” Marten (2015, 
p.196) gives a particularly salient illustration of this: Viktor Medvedchuk, one of Ukrainian 
President Petro Poroshenko’s early patrons, has since become a spokesperson for Eastern 
rebel groups. Yet when Medvedchuk participated in the Minsk II discussions, he did so as a 
representative of the Ukrainian state. Why was he chosen to fill this contradictory role? 
Because Vladimir Putin is the godfather of one of Medvedchuk’s daughters. 
 This stratification plays an important role in determining Russian foreign policy. 
Returning to Moravcsik’s (1997, p.518) idea of state preferences, in a nonrepresentational 
system like Russia, the state in constrained by the interests of actors at the top of the power 
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hierarchy, and state preferences are set accordingly. When these actors are sufficiently risk-
accepting or insulated from the negative effects of war, combined with an inability of the law 
or representative institutions to limit their ability act, their power “tends to be wielded in a 
more arbitrary manner…leading both to a wider range of expected outcomes and a more 
conflictual average” (Moravcsik, 1997, p.532). Thus the dissonance between Russian 
stratification and the global systems’ functional differentiation places enormous stress on the 
ruling elite and enables them to react in ways outside observers would label extreme. By 
these extreme actions—for example, annexing Crimea, or sowing discord in Eastern 
Ukraine—the Russian leadership hopes to keep its privileged place astride both the 
functionally differentiated global society and the stratified Russian society.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 Postmodern states and offensive realism are effective at describing the foreign policy 
decisions and behavior shown by actors in the Ukraine crisis, but social systems theory is 
able to provide a much deeper look into why and how each actor makes the decisions they do. 
It accomplishes this by comparing the regional distinctions of each actor with the global 
systems in which they participate, which in turn informs, first, how the actors define the 
world and their role in it, and second, their relationship to (and subsequent obligations or 
rights concerning) other actors. 
 Ukraine is positioned where the European Eastern Partnership meets the Russian 
sphere of influence. This puts Ukraine between two very different regions, each having 
developed in unique ways and resulting in different regional reactions toward global society. 
On the one side, the European states have developed powerful interstate institutions, the best 
example being the European Union, that have dramatically altered their state political 
organizations; however, the tension between these transnational institutions and the 
governments of the individual member states hinders their ability to act swiftly or decisively, 
leaving states like Ukraine that depend upon their actions in the lurch. On the other side, the 
Russian state possesses a strongly hierarchical political system in which a powerful executive 
branch, supported by informal patronage networks, exerts control over policy decisions, most 
often as means of safeguarding their privileged position at the top of the hierarchy. 
In recent years, the result has been like two powerful river currents smashing 
together, often leaving Ukraine battered and disoriented in their confluence. Although each 
	   39	  
of the actors investigated in this paper exists within a global social system, the regional 
differences between them radically and fundamentally affect both their means and manner of 
participation therein. 
In seeking a resolution to Ukraine’s crises, one must look deeper than explanatory 
theories separating European and Russian policymaking into two competing worldviews; this 
runs the risk of accepting their regional differences as fact, in essence declaring “Europeans 
are from Mars, Russians are from Venus.” Instead, a practical exploration into why their 
systems differ and how their social structures inform their foreign policies not only reveals 
much more about their policymaking, but also invites further opportunities for understanding, 
for finding common ground, and perhaps even for conflict resolution.  
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